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When a domain name is registered, the registrant is given five 
days to cancel for a full refund.  While the purpose of this grace 
period is to protect those who innocently err in the registration 
process, speculators have taken advantage of the grace period 
through a process called “domain tasting.”  These “domain 
tasters” register hundreds of thousands of domain names and 
cancel the vast majority of them within the five-day grace period, 
keeping only those that may be valuable as placeholder advertising 
websites or to holders of trademark rights.  This iBrief will outline 
the “domain tasting” process, analyze why it is a problem, and 
discuss solutions to the problem.  Ultimately, it concludes that the 
five-day grace period is unnecessary because it serves little, if any, 
legitimate purpose. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Since 2001, agreements between the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”)2 and top-level domain (“TLD”) 
                                                     
1 J.D. Candidate, 2008, Duke University School of Law.  B.A. in Mathematics, 
Linguistics, and Economics, 2005, Rutgers College. 
2 The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) “is 
responsible for managing and coordinating the Domain Name System (DNS”) to 
ensure that every address is unique and that all users of the Internet can find all 
valid addresses.  It does this by overseeing the distribution of unique IP 
addresses and domain names.  It also ensures that each domain name maps to 
the correct IP address . . . ICANN is also responsible for accrediting the domain 
name registrars.  ‘Accredit’ means to identify and set minimum standards for the 
performance of registration functions, to recognize persons or entities meeting 
those standards, and to enter into an accreditation agreement that sets forth the 
rules and procedures applicable to the provision of Registrar Services.” ICANN, 
FAQs, http://www.icann.org/faq/#WhatisICANN (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).  
See also ICANN, The Global Internet Community Working Together to 
Promote the Stability and Integrity of the Internet, 
http://www.icann.org/tr/english.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (providing 
information on ICANN in general, DNS, ICANN’s role, how ICANN works, 
ICANN’s accomplishments, and ICANN’s ongoing work). 
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registrars3 required what is called the “Add Grace Period” or “AGP,” which 
allows a registrant to receive a full refund for canceling a domain name 
within five days of the initial registration.4  The AGP was initially intended 
to be a safeguard for inexperienced or careless registrants who mistyped the 
name of their desired domain and would otherwise be stuck with a name 
they did not want.5  However, it appears that the AGP is being used 
primarily by individuals and organizations practicing “domain tasting” or 
“domain kiting.”6  Numerous commentators within the Internet-technology 
community expressed concern, frustration, and disappointment that little or 
nothing is being done to combat what they see as a harmful practice carried 
out by individuals and companies with questionable moral values.7 
¶2 This iBrief begins by explaining the basics of domain tasting.  It 
explains the use of the AGP as a tool for improper domain-name 
registration practices and provides evidence that such practices are taking 
place.  Part II discusses why domain tasting is a problem, analyzing its 
effect on technical aspects of domain-name registration, the integrity of 
domain-name registration, and trademark-right infringement through 
cybersquatting.  In Part III, solutions to the domain tasting problem are 
discussed and a proposal to eliminate the AGP altogether is endorsed and 
defended. 
                                                     
3 Top-Level Domains, or TLDs are the “right most label in a domain name.” 
ICANN, Top-Level Domains (gTLDs), http://www.icann.org/tlds (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2007).  There are currently fourteen “generic” TLDs: .com, .edu, .gov, 
.int, .mil, .net, .org, .biz, .info, .name, .pro, .aero, .coop, and .museum.  See id. 
4 See, ICANN, Unsponsored TLD Agreement: Appendix C, Section I (.info), 
May 11, 2001, http://www.icann.org/tlds/agreements/info/registry-agmt-appc-i-
11may01.htm. 
5 Posting of John Levine to CircleID, 
http://www.circleid.com/posts/domain_in_bad_taste (May 2, 2006, 9:14 PST). 
6 See id; see also Hot Points Blog, 
http://www.bobparsons.com/DomainKiting.html (May 10, 2006, 16:31 EST) 
(creating the term “domain kiting” and explaining how it works and why it is a 
problem). 
7 See Hot Points Blog, supra note 6; see also Posting of Frank Schilling to 
CircleID, http://www.circleid.com/posts/historical_analysis_domain_tasting 
(Dec. 20 2006, 8:00 PST); Levine, supra note 5; Terri Wells, Domain Tasting: 
Hard to Swallow, SEO, Jan 22, 2007, http://www.seochat.com/c/a/Website-
Promotion-Help/Domain-Tasting-Hard-to-Swallow; Doug Isenberg, ICANN 
Needs to Clamp Down on Domain Name Abuse, CNET NEWS.COM, June 21, 
2006, 
http://news.com.com/ICANN+needs+to+clamp+down+on+domain+name+abus
e/2010-1030_3-6084970.html; Anick Jesdanun, Entrepreneurs Profit from Free 
Web Names, USA TODAY, Feb. 19, 2007, 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2007-02-19-web-address-sampling_x.htm. 
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I. DOMAIN TASTING BASICS 
A. How Domain Tasting Works 
¶3 Domain tasting and domain kiting are two similar practices 
involving the use of the AGP by domain-name registrants.  The basic 
process for domain tasting is as follows.  An individual or company 
registers a domain name, fills it with pay-per-click ads,8 and then monitors 
the website for about four days.9  If it appears that the website will produce 
more than $6 of advertising revenue over the course of a year,10 then the 
domain name will be profitable, and the registrant will maintain the pay-
per-click website.11  If, however, it turns out that the website will not 
generate enough pay-per-click revenue (i.e. it will generate less than $6 per 
year), the registration is then cancelled within the five-day grace period.12 
¶4 A similar activity is what Bob Parsons, CEO of GoDaddy.com,13 
calls “domain kiting.”14  Those involved in domain kiting, unlike domain 
tasting, essentially never pay the registration fee for any of their websites.15  
Instead, they continually cancel each registration with the five-day grace 
period and then renew the same name repeatedly, thus running a more or 
less continuous website that always falls within the AGP.16  According to 
Parsons, domain kiters and tasters overlap when a domain name is 
“especially profitable.”17  Parsons believes that registrants who happen to 
                                                     
8 Pay-Per-Click (“PPC”) “is defined as the guaranteed placement of a small ‘ad’ 
on the search results page for a specific keyword or keywords in return for a 
specified payment, but ONLY when a visitor clicks on that ad.  The advertiser 
pays nothing to appear on the results page; they only pay the amount they have 
agreed to (or bid for) when someone actually clicks on their ad and is taken to 
their landing page; therefore, the term ‘pay per click.’”  See Pay Per Click 
Universe, What are Pay Per Click Search Engines?, 
http://www.payperclickuniverse.com/what-are-pay-per-click-search-engines.php 
(list visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
9 See Wells, supra note 7 (describing the process generally). 
10 For purposes of this paper, I assume that the typical registration fee for a 
domain name is $6.  See Levine, supra note 5; Hot Points Blog, supra note 6; 
Wells, supra note 7. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 “GoDaddy.com is the world’s largest domain name registrar . . . .”  About 
GoDaddy.com, 
https://www.godaddy.com/gdshop/about.asp?app%5Fhdr=&ci=4632 (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
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find themselves with websites producing profits exceeding the minimal 
registration cost threshold may choose to pay the registration fee rather than 
risk losing the website altogether in their attempt to cancel and renew under 
their typical kiting strategy.18  For the purposes of this paper the distinction 
between the two is largely irrelevant.19 
B. Evidence of Domain Tasting 
¶5 Despite the abundance of talk about domain tasting, “there has 
never really been any solid evidence” that it actually occurs.20  However, 
the circumstantial evidence indicating the prevalence of domain tasting is 
convincing enough for most.  According to Bob Parsons, a company called 
DirectNIC registered over 8.4 million domain names in April 2006 alone 
and subsequently cancelled all but 51,000 of them.21  In addition, he cites a 
figure that several other commentators have taken as evidence of the 
existence of domain tasting: In April 2006, 35 million domain names were 
registered, but only 2.3 million were actual, permanent registrations paid for 
by the registrant.22  A look at individual registrars paints a much clearer 
picture.  According to VeriSign’s23 March 2006 monthly report, there are at 
least seven domain-name registrars whose deleted registrations grossly 





Belgiumdomains, LLC 250,037 7,258,306
Capitoldomains, LLC 282,883 4,588,188
Domaindoorman, LLC 191,048 4,522,019
                                                     
18 Id. 
19 This paper will use the term “domain tasting” to refer to both practices except 
when specifically referencing a source that uses the term “domain kiting” or 
when the distinction is actually relevant. 
20 See Dylan Kingsberry, How Does Your Domain Taste?, EZINE ARTICLES, Feb. 
22, 2007, http://ezinearticles.com/?How-Does-Your-Domain-
Taste?&id=464867. 
21 See Hot Points Blog, supra note 6. 
22 Id; see also Domain Name Kiting, http://www.domainnamekiting.com/ (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
23 VeriSign, among other things, is the registrar for all “.com” domain names.  
See Ryan M. Kaatz & Julie Erin Land, Lawsuit Naming High-Volume, Domain 
“Tasting” Registrar Blazes New Trail in Combating Online Trademark 
Infringement, http://www.digitalbrands.info/Dotster_article6.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2007). 
24 VERISIGN, REGISTRY OPERATOR’S MONTHLY REPORT: MARCH 2006 (Apr. 18, 
2006), available at http://www.icann.org/tlds/monthly-reports/com-net/verisign-
200603.pdf. 
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Dotster, Inc. 946,953 1,920,658
Intercosmos Media Group, Inc. d/b/a directNIC.com 1,188,733 6,822,192
NameKing.com, Inc. 488,356 1,592,029
Nameview, Inc. 672,009 2,737,139
Chart 125
 
¶6 In comparison to these registrars, GoDaddy.com had 9,466,028 
permanent registrations and only 141,182 deletions.26  In the case of what 
appears to be the most egregious offender, Belgiumdomains, LLC, the ratio 
of deletions to actual registrations is 29:1 whereas for GoDaddy.com, the 
ratio is 1:67.  It simply cannot be by pure chance that Belgiumdomains 
deletes almost 97% of its registrations and GoDaddy.com deletes less than 
2%.27  The most logical explanation for this disparity is that 
Belgiumdomains engaged in blatant domain tasting.28  While some may still 
be skeptical that domain tasting is taking place,29 the evidence of domain 
tasting is strong, and this paper assumes that domain tasting does in fact 
occur. 
II. IS DOMAIN TASTING A PROBLEM? 
¶7 Among those commentators discussing the topic of domain tasting, 
there seems to be a consensus that it is a growing problem that needs to be 
fixed.30  Unfortunately, the practice of domain tasting itself is currently not 
illegal,31 but many argue that it is nonetheless morally reprehensible and not 
in the proper spirit of domain-name registration.32 
                                                     
25 See id. 
26 Id.; see also Kaatz & Land, supra note 23. 
27 See supra Chart 1 accompanying note 25.  The disparity between the two 
numbers is so great that a statistical analysis is unnecessary to conclude that it is 
not the result of pure chance. 
28 See Hot Points Blog, supra note 6 (commenting on the ratio of deleted names 
to actual registrations by DirectNIC). 
29 See Kingsberry, supra note 20. 
30 See Schilling, supra note 7; Levine, supra note 5; Wells, supra note 7; 
Isenberg, supra note 7; Jesdanun, supra note 7; Parsons, supra note 6.  Of 
course, those who are most vocal are the ones seeking change, so it is unclear 
whether or not those opposed are in the majority. 
31 See Domain Name Kiting, supra note 22 (“Kiting is not illegal as per 
current…provisions of ICANN rules.”). 
32 See Schilling, supra note 7; Levine, supra note 5; Wells, supra note 7; 
Isenberg, supra note 7; Jesdanun, supra note 7; Hot Points Blog, supra note 6. 
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A. Arguments in Favor of Domain Tasting 
¶8 No one believes that domain tasting is actually illegal or prohibited 
by ICANN or anyone else.33  Under current ICANN rules, the AGP can be 
used to cancel a domain-name registration for any reason, legitimate or 
otherwise.34  The ICANN rule outlining the AGP is stated simply and 
directly and does not require that the registrant have any specific reason to 
cancel the registration.35  As a result, one might argue that if domain tasting 
were really a problem, ICANN, domain name registrars, or the government 
would see fit to change the rules to prevent it. 
¶9 Those who engage in domain tasting consider themselves an 
Internet analog to real estate developers.36  A company called Maltuzi 
Holdings frankly states, “[i]n simplest terms, this is no different than 
acquiring an apartment building for rental income.”37  Essentially, the 
argument is that domain-name registration operates in a free market—there 
is nothing restricting any individual or organization from registering any 
available domain name, and all domain names are available on a first-come 
first-serve basis.  If you are first, then you get the domain name, and if you 
are not first, then you do not.  One could rationally argue that this is 
substantively similar to any other commodity in which there is a limited 
supply and a demand exceeding that supply. 
B. Domain Tasting Abuses the Add Grace Period 
¶10 The AGP “was introduced to provide a mechanism for registrars 
and registrants to correct mistakes”38 and “reverse fraudulent 
registrations.”39  The idea is that sometimes an individual may inadvertently 
make a minor error in the registration process.  If he realizes it within a 
short period (five days), then he can cancel the registration, receive a full 
refund, and proceed to register the proper name.  However, the AGP has 
proved extremely valuable to speculators who use it to sample a website for 
up to five days, risk free, to determine whether or not the website will be 
valuable to them as a source of pay-per-click revenue.40  As previously 
discussed, it appears that several registrars are tasting domain names on a 
                                                     
33 See Domain Name Kiting, supra note 22. 
34 See, e.g., ICANN, supra note 4. 
35 See id. 
36 See Larry Seltzer, Bad Taste: Another Way ICANN Blew Domain 




39 Domain Name Kiting, supra note 22. 
40 See Levine, supra note 5. 
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massive scale.41  Some registrars, most notably Belgiumdomains, are 
canceling almost 97% of their registrations within the AGP.42  It almost 
goes without saying that the vast majority of these registrations are not due 
to simple typographical errors on the part of innocent domain-name 
registrants. 
1. Domain Tasting is a Drain on the Domain Name Registration System 
¶11 Some speculate that the percentage of domain-name registrations 
that end up being refunded may be as high as 99%.43  Assuming that this 
percentage is accurate or close to accurate,44 then for every legitimate, 
normal registration, 99 other domain names are registered and then deleted 
within five days.  Thus, for each legitimate registration, a domain-name 
registrar must perform 198 essentially useless transactions (99 registrations 
and 99 deletions).45  One need not be an expert in economics to see that this 
is undoubtedly an inefficient process.  Assuming that the cost of registering 
a domain name is $6, then for every $6 fee that a domain registrar receives, 
they performed 100 registrations (the 99 cancelled registrations and the 1 
legitimate registration) and 99 cancellations.  If each of these transactions 
(registrations and cancellations) costs the registrar more than three cents, 
then they are losing money as a result of the AGP abuse.46  Notably, the 
Public Interest Registry (“PIR”), which maintains all “.org” domain 
names,47 indicated that domain tasting has a “potential [negative] 
impact…on the stability and security of the Internet.”48 
2. Domain Tasting Compromises the Integrity of the Domain Name 
Registration Process 
                                                     
41 See supra Chart 1 accompanying note 25. 
42 Id. 
43 See Levine, supra note 5; Hot Points Blog, supra note 6. 
44 The actual accuracy of the 99% estimate is not largely relevant.  The analysis 
is similar regardless of the number, so for the sake of argument, the 99% figure 
will be used. 
45 See Levine, supra note 5 (discussing this very concept but with numbers that 
are slightly inaccurate). 
46 See id. 
47 “[I]t is the Public Interest Registry (PIR), which manages the .ORG top-level 
domain name and maintains the database of all .ORG Internet addresses.”  
Public Interest Registry, http://www.pir.org (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
48 See Letter from Edward G. Viltz, President & CEO, Public Interest Registry, 
to Dr. Stephen D. Crocker, Security & Stability Advisory Committee Liaison 
(Mar. 26, 2006), available at http://www.pir.org/PDFs/SSAC-
ICANN_ORG_Tasting_3-26-06.pdf.  Unfortunately, the PIR does not appear to 
have elaborated on how they believe the “stability and security” are 
compromised. 
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¶12 The PIR stated that their “primary concerns center around the 
consequences of a . . . new . . . domain, purchased based on traffic and 
subsequently utilized in a contradictory scope of . . . [PIR’s] mission.”49  In 
their view, the public interest requires that domain names be registered 
primarily for their actual use and that the corresponding website be based on 
the actual meaning of the domain name rather than simply acting as a 
placeholder website taking advantage of pay-per-click advertising.50 
¶13 Similarly, domain tasting makes it difficult or impossible for 
individuals and companies to register their own legitimate domain names 
because such a large percentage of available or desirable domain names are 
registered by domain tasters at any given moment.51  Even worse, one 
party’s interest in a domain name, in some cases, leads another party to 
register it.52  According to Larry Seltzer, author of “Larry Seltzer’s Security 
Weblog,”53 a company called Chesterton Holdings has access to and uses 
individual WHOIS54 search data to register domain names.55  Seltzer 
searched for WHOIS information through Cnet’s Domain Search56 for 
random (and presumably undesirable) domain names like 
“myfuzzycat.com” and “lickmynose.com.”57  He didn’t register either of 
these names and several days later checked the WHOIS data for these two 
domain names with a different WHOIS search service.58  At that point, he 
found out that both names were registered by Chesterton Holdings.59  
                                                     
49 Id. (emphasis added). 
50 See id. 
51 See ICANNWiki, Domain Tasting, 
http://www.icannwiki.com/Domain_tasting (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
52 Chesterton Holdings is a “[d]omain name holding company founded in 
California.”  Chesterton Holdings LLC, http://www.chestertonholdings.com 
(click on link to “company background”) (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
53 Larry Seltzer’s Security Weblog, http://blog.eweek.com/blogs/larry_seltzer 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
54 “ICANN requires accredited registrars to collect and provide free public 
access to the name of the registered domain name and its nameservers and 
registrar, the date the domain was created and when its registration expires, and 
the contact information for the Registered Name Holder, the technical contact, 
and the administrative contact.”  ICANN, Whois Services, 
http://www.icann.org/topics/whois-services (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).  This 
data is collectively referred to as “WHOIS” data. 
55 See Larry Seltzer, Whois Hijacking My Domain Research?, EWEEK.COM, July 
19, 2006, http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1991365,00.asp. 
56 The New York Times and CNet.com, Domain Search, 
http://cnet.nytimes.com/Domain_name_search/4002-6551_7-5116058.html (last 
visited Nov. 10, 20007). 
57 Seltzer, supra note 55. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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Strangely, Seltzer later performed domain-name searches through individual 
hosting services,60 also of essentially random and useless domain names, 
and none of them were subsequently registered by Chesterton Holdings.61  
It appears that even beyond the mere chance that a domain taster will have 
already registered a name that you desire for your own legitimate use, some 
domain tasters have unauthorized access to your searches, so if you don’t 
register your desired name right away, it will be registered by a taster who 
assumes there must be some value in it as a result of your desire to search 
for it.62 
3. Domain Tasting Harms Trademark Holders and Facilitates 
Cybersquatting 
¶14 Cybersquatting is not a new practice and is not unique to domain 
tasting.  As early as 1998, the federal courts held that owners of domain 
names could be found liable for trademark dilution by registering a domain 
name that was identical or confusingly similar to the trademark of another 
individual or company.63  The problem with domain tasting is that it makes 
the cybersquatter’s job easier. 
a. Domain Tasting Facilitates Registration of Infringing Domain Names 
¶15 Domain tasters register hundreds, thousands, or even millions of 
domain names over the course of a single month.64  Companies like 
Chesterton Holdings claim that “[d]omain names are not specifically 
targeted and are not collected by any untoward methods.”65  Even if one 
believes that this is true, the probability that some percentage of random 
domain-name registrations are infringing is likely very high.66  If domain 
                                                     
60 CNet’s search is a meta-search of individual hosting services.  See id. 
61 Id.  In other words, Chesteron Holdings appears to have access of WHOIS 
queries that are run through CNet’s meta-search, but not to the searches that are 
performed on individual hosting services. 
62 See id. 
63 See Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(requiring the owner of panavision.com to transfer the domain to Panavision, the 
rightful owner of the trademark).  This paper assumes that the reader is familiar 
with the concept of cybersquatting and thus does not attempt to describe the 
practice in general. 
64 See supra Chart 1 accompanying note 25.  Even if we assume that the roughly 
seven million deletions made by Belgiumdomains were the same domain names 
being registered every 4 or 5 days, they would still have over one million unique 
domain names registered and deleted within the span of a single month. 
65 Chesterton Holdings LLC, http://www.chestertonholdings.com (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2007). 
66 Under ICANN rules, one must show “bad faith” to make a case for 
cybersquatting.  ICANN, Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy, R. 3(b)(ix)(3), Oct. 24, 1999, http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-
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tasters are not interested in cybersquatting, it may be the case that they are 
willing to turn over infringing names when contacted by the rightful owner.  
Even if one assumes that they are, there is still a problem because an 
individual seeking to register a legitimate name would have to contact a 
third party (i.e. the domain “taster”) who currently owns the domain name 
and then convince the third party that the individual is in fact the rightful 
owner of the domain name.  Clearly, this would require resources beyond 
the few moments it would take to register a domain name through the 
normal process.  Factor in the assumption that companies like Chesterton 
Holdings may be less than willing to turn over domain names to individuals 
or companies claiming a trademark right in one of Chesteron’s domains, or 
further, the assumption that many domain tasters are in fact attempting to 
profit from cybersquatting, and it becomes evident that the AGP is making 
it more difficult for legitimate domain name registrants to obtain their 
desired domain name. 
¶16 In addition, cybersquatters can register hundreds or thousands of 
domain names similar to trademarked names in an attempt to benefit from 
“typosquatting.”67  A recent lawsuit filed against domain-name registrar 
Dotster, Inc. alleged that Dotster was involved in typosquatting against 
Neiman Marcus.68  According to the complaint, Dotster registered over 
twenty-five domain names similar to the plaintiffs’ trademarks.69  “Most of 
the offending domains listed in the complaint seem to be obvious 
misspellings of the plaintiffs’ marks.”70  The lawsuit has since been 
                                                                                                                       
rules.htm.  If we assume that companies like Chesterton Holdings are in fact not 
targeting specific domain names, their failure to safeguard against registering 
infringing names may be enough to constitute bad faith.  See Domain Tasting 
Makes WIPO Sick, OUT-LAW.COM, Mar. 15, 2007, http://www.out-
law.com/page-7878 (“With regard to bulk buyers of domain names using 
automated registration processes, a WIPO panel decision issued in February 
2006 found that failure to conduct prior checks for third-party rights in certain 
circumstances would represent ‘wilful blindness,’ representing bad faith under 
the UDRP.”).  The UDRP is the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy, which “sets forth the terms and conditions in connection with a dispute 
between you and any party . . . over the registration and use of an Internet 
domain name registered by you.”  See ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy, Oct. 24, 1999, http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-
24oct99.htm. 
67 See Jesdanun, supra note 7 (“‘A day where 100 Neiman Marcus names get 
registered is not an uncommon day.’” (quoting David Steele, attorney for 
Neiman Marcus)). 
68 See id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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settled,71 but considering the sheer number of domains tasted,72 it is 
unlikely that lawsuits would be sufficient as a preventative measure against 
similar acts of typosquatting, cybersquatting, or domain tasting in general. 
b. Domain Tasting Makes it Difficult to Track Down Cybersquatters 
¶17 ICANN requires all accredited registrars to provide contact 
information about domain-name registrants through WHOIS.73  One reason 
that WHOIS data is so important is because it allows trademark holders to 
track down those who violate their trademarks by registering infringing 
domain names.74  If Company X discovered that the “companyx.com” 
domain was registered by another party, the company could do a WHOIS 
search75 to find out the relevant contact information of the current domain-
name owner.76  However, there is evidence that many domain-name 
registrants, especially those with questionable motives, do not take the 
WHOIS system seriously.  One ICANN dispute resolution case involved a 
cybersquatter who entered his name as “Sdf fdgg” when filling out the 
registration for his domain name.77  Others identified themselves as 
“DOMAIN FOR SALE” and as “Meow.”78  Clearly, none of this 
information helps a trademark owner contact the domain name owner in 
order to protect its legitimate trademark rights.79  The problem is further 
exacerbated by the fact that domain tasters constantly cancel domain-name 
registrations within the five-day AGP.  As a result, a domain name that 
violates one’s trademark rights may be owned by dozens of different 
                                                     
71 See Dotster Settles with Neiman Marcus over Typosquatting, DOMAIN NAME 
WIRE, Feb, 19, 2007, http://domainnamewire.com/2007/02/19/dotster-settles-
with-neiman-marcus-over-typosquatting. 
72 See supra Chart 1 accompanying note 25. 
73 See ICANN, supra note 54; see also Isenberg, supra note 7. 
74 See Isenberg, supra note 7. 
75 WHOIS searches can be performed through numerous services, such as 
http://www.betterwhois.com. 
76 The trademark holder would be able to find “the name of the registered 
domain name and its nameservers and registrar, the date the domain was created 
and when its registration expires, and the contact information for the Registered 
Name Holder, the technical contact, and the administrative contact.”  See 
ICANN, supra note 54. 
77 Isenberg, supra note 7. 
78 Id. 
79 In many cases, this may not be a major issue as the trademark owner could file 
for dispute resolution under the UDRP and would likely have the domain name 
transferred to him if the defendant failed to reply and take part in the dispute 
resolution.  See ICANN, Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy, Oct. 24, 1999, http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm (“If a 
Respondent does not submit a response, in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances, the Panel shall decide the dispute based upon the complaint.”). 
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registrants over the course of only a few months, thus making it 
increasingly difficult to identify the owner and enforce trademark rights.80 
III. SOLUTIONS 
¶18 There are several possible solutions to the domain tasting issue.  
First, some argue that nothing needs to be done and current safeguards are 
sufficient to deal with any problems that have arisen and may arise in the 
future.81  Others advocated a nominal “restocking fee” for the cancellation 
of a domain-name registration.82  Finally, some commentators advocate for, 
and I endorse, a complete elimination of the AGP.83 
A. The UDRP May Adequately Deal with Cybersquatters 
¶19 In 2006 there were 1,823 cybersquatting cases filed under the 
Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (“UDRP.”)84  In the 
same period, there were a total of approximately 40,400,000 domain names 
registered.85  That means that only 1 out of every 22,161 domain-name 
registrations resulted in a cybersquatting claim under the UDRP.  Even if 
every one of those claims were successful, it is unlikely that cybersquatting 
is really occurring on a sufficiently massive scale leading to significant 
deterioration of the Internet.86  As a result, it may be the case that 
“cybersquatting is only a very minor problem that is more than adequately 
addressed with current policies and procedures.”87 
¶20 On the other hand, there is no reason to rely on the UDRP to handle 
cybersquatting cases if elimination of the AGP would reduce the number of 
                                                     
80 See Isenberg, supra note 7. 
81 See, e.g., WIPO: Cybersquatting on the Rise!, DAILY DOMAINER, Mar. 13, 
2007, http://www.dailydomainer.com/2007103-wipo-cybersquatting.html. 
82 See, e.g., id.; Domain Name Kiting, supra note 22; Domain Tasting Makes 
WIPO Sick, supra note 66. 
83 See, e.g., Levine, supra note 5. 
84 WIPO: Cybersquatting on the Rise!, supra note 81. 
85 VERISIGN, THE DOMAIN NAME INDUSTRY BRIEF, VOL. 4, ISSUE 1 (Mar. 2007), 
http://www.verisign.com/static/040767.pdf (indicating that in 2006 there was an 
average of 10.1 million new registrations per quarter). 
86 One might argue that the 1,823 UDRP cases are more significant when 
compared to the number of legitimate registrations rather than to all 
registrations, which includes millions of domain taster registrations.  While this 
is a legitimate point, there remains no doubt that 1,823 is small compared to the 
total number of even legitimate domain-name registrations.  In addition, 
presumably a non-negligible percentage of UDRP cases involve registrations by 
actual or alleged Domain Tasters, so the numbers may be skewed in both 
directions. 
87 WIPO: Cybersquatting on the Rise!, supra note 81. 
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cybersquatting cases in the first place.88  Of course, cybersquatting will still 
occur even in the absence of the AGP,89 and for these cases, the UDRP may 
be a sufficient remedy.  Nevertheless, it is a waste of resources and 
inefficient to handle cybersquatting cases using the UDRP when such cases 
may never have come to fruition in the absence of the AGP. 
B. A Fee Should Be Charged for Cancellation of a Domain Name 
¶21 Various individuals and organizations, most notably the PIR,90 
endorsed imposing a small fee for cancelled registrations.91  Basically, 
instead of allowing a full refund for all domain-name registration 
cancellations, a refund would be issued if the name is cancelled within the 
AGP, but there would be a nominal processing fee.92  In theory, it would 
not be worth it for domain tasters to continue to register unprofitable 
domain names at a rate of five cents each.  Consider the aforementioned 
Belgiumdomains.93  If we take Belgiumdomains’ 7.3 million deletions in 
March, 2006 and assume it would be charged five cents for each one, they 
would incur a total fee of approximately $363,000.94  In addition, they have 
registered and kept about 250,000 domain names, which, at $6 each, totals 
another $1.5 million.  At the very least, the additional $363,000 would 
make domain tasting less attractive to Belgiumdomains.  A twenty-five-cent 
cancellation fee would more than double Belgiumdomains’ registration 
expenses.95 
                                                     
88 See discussion supra Part II.B.iii. 
89 Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).  Panavision 
was decided well before the inception of the AGP. 
90 “[I]t is the Public Interest Registry (PIR), which manages the .ORG top-level 
domain name and maintains the database of all .ORG Internet addresses.”  
Public Interest Registry, http://www.pir.org (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
91 See, e.g., WIPO: Cybersquatting on the Rise!, supra note 81; Domain Name 
Kiting, supra note 22; Domain Tasting Makes WIPO Sick, supra note 66; see 
also ICANN Registry Request Service, Excess Deletions Fee, Sept. 22, 2006, 
available at http://www.icann.org/registries/rsep/PIR_request.pdf [hereinafter 
PIR request]. 
92 The PIR has requested a fee of five cents.  See PIR request, supra note 91.  
The PIR Request provides additional qualifications such that not all 
cancellations will result in the five-cent fee.  Rather, the fee will be charged only 
when the registrar has cancelled more than 90% of total registrations over the 
course of a pre-determined length of time.  See id. 
93 See supra Chart 1 accompanying note 25. 
94 Belgiumdomains’ 7,258,306 deletions at five cents apiece results in a total fee 
of  $362,915.30. 
95 Belgiumdomains’ 7,258,306 deletions at twenty-five cents apiece results in a 
total fee of $1,814,576.50. 
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C. The Add Grace Period Should Be Eliminated Altogether 
¶22 Theoretically, the AGP exists to protect individuals who register a 
domain name and later realize they made a typo or other similar error and 
want to cancel their registration.  However, it is unclear whether or not this 
is really a major problem.  At least one commentator doesn’t seem to think 
it is,96 and logic agrees with him.  Consider Company Y which is 
attempting to register a domain name for its business.  The company 
inadvertently registers the domain name “www.CompanyZ.com” and does 
not realize it until the next day.  To their delight, because of the AGP, they 
can cancel the registration and receive a full refund of the $6 they paid for 
the domain name.  Now suppose there is no AGP.  Company Y will either 
maintain the CompanyZ.com domain name and redirect traffic to a new 
website (assuming that CompanyZ.com is not an infringing name) or they 
will simply cancel the domain registration, properly register 
www.CompanyY.com, and suffer a $6 loss for the erroneous registration.  If 
this $6 loss results in the financial ruin of Company Y, perhaps the world is 
a better place without it.  The point is that even if everyone in the world 
were so incompetent as to be unable to properly register domain names, the 
worst that can happen is they lose an insignificant amount of money and 
learn a lesson in paying attention to details.  It would be a stretch to argue 
that the AGP is justified on this basis alone, yet I have not encountered, nor 
can I conceive of another justification for it, other than one that openly 
supports and endorses domain tasting. 
¶23 Similarly, while I agree that the imposition of a small fee for 
domain name cancellations may deter domain tasters to some extent, it is 
unclear that this goes far enough.  For example, in the case of 
Belgiumdomains, we saw that their total registration fees were 
approximately $1.5 million.97  The addition of a $0.05 fee for cancellations 
would increase their total domain-name registration expenses by about 
24%.98  While this is a considerable increase, it is possible that 
Belgiumdomains is turning a profit of over 24%.  Further, since 
Belgiumdomains appears to be one of most egregious domain tasters, the 
increase in registration expenses through a fee would be lower than 24% for 
most other registrars, thus increasing the odds that such a fee would not 
sufficiently deter them from domain tasting.99 
                                                     
96 See Levine, supra note 5. 
97 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
98 See id. 
99 The PIR and ICANN have recently implemented a five-cent fee for “excess 
deletions,” which became effective on February 13, 2007.  See Amendment No. 
1 to .ORG Registry Agreement, Feb. 22, 2007, available at 
http://www.icann.org/tlds/agreements/org/pir-amendment-22feb07.pdf.  It is too 
early to tell what effect, if any, this fee will have on domain name registrants. 
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¶24 As a solution for the domain tasting problem, the elimination of the 
AGP makes the most sense.  The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that 
the only ones benefiting from the AGP on any substantial level are those 
who are taking advantage of it for the purposes of domain tasting.100  The 
fact that a very small number of people utilize the AGP for legitimate 
reasons (whether it be for typos or just an individual who registers a domain 
name in good faith and realizes a few days later he simply does not want it) 
hardly justifies maintaining a policy inviting such abuse.  I applaud those 
individuals taking advantage of the AGP.  They made it abundantly clear to 
the Internet community that the AGP was never a good idea and continues 
to be a pointless safeguard.  Removing the AGP would effectively eliminate 
the ability of domain registrants to endlessly “taste” domain names or to 
continually register and cancel them without ever having to pay.  It should 
reduce the total number of domain name-registrations, thus freeing up 
domain names for legitimate registrants, and simultaneously reduce the 
number of trademark infringing domain names. 
CONCLUSION 
¶25 Domain tasting is a growing problem.  Tasters took advantage of 
the AGP in order to register domain names for free, either indefinitely or for 
short periods of time in order to profit from pay-per-click advertising.  In 
reality, the AGP serves almost no purpose other than to facilitate domain 
tasting, which has detrimental effects on both the everyday attempted 
domain-name registrant who is unable to obtain his desired domain, and 
more importantly, on holders of trademarks finding themselves facing both 
a greater number of infringing websites and the difficulty of tracking down 
cybersquatters.  While the UDRP may help resolve individual cases of 
cybersquatting, it does little in terms of deterrence.  And while a nominal 
fee for domain-name registration cancellations may deter some domain 
tasters, it is unclear that it is sufficient to eliminate the problem.  
Elimination of the AGP is a simple, effective, and efficient solution to many 
of the problems related to domain tasting, and ICANN should recognize this 
as the appropriate and most effective course of action. 
                                                     
100 See supra Chart 1 accompanying note 25. 
